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Securing the Future by Remembering the Past: But just when does this Past and 
Future Begin to Develop? 
 
Klein (2013) suggests that at least one evolutionary pressure that led to the emergence 
of associative memory is the need for organisms to anticipate and plan for the future.  
That is, we remember the past in the service of securing our future survival, 
something that has considerable fitness relevance.  In fact, those who can use the past 
to more effectively anticipate the future must surely enjoy increased opportunities for 
reproductive success. 
 The current zeitgeist in memory research is sympathetic with Klein’s (2013) 
view, particularly among those who dabble in what is known as “adaptive memory” 
(see articles in Howe & Otgaar, in press and chapters in Schwartz, Howe, Toglia, & 
Otgaar, 2014).  Although most agree that memory for the past is a harbinger for 
understanding the present and anticipating the future in adult humans, there is less 
consensus concerning whether memory behaves in a similar fashion in nonhuman 
animals as well as younger humans (i.e., infants and toddlers).  Klein (2013, pp. xxx-
xxx) argues that, “all organisms capable of memory are, of necessity, oriented toward 
the future … Species-specific differences in future-orientation trade on complexity 
and temporal scope of anticipatory and planning abilities, not on their presence or 
absence.” 
Although organisms endowed with associative memory may be able to use the 
past to anticipate the future, the question posed in this article is one about when this 
episodic foresight or future thinking1 emerges in an organism’s ontogeny.  
Specifically, when has an organism stored enough of its past to anticipate its future?  
That is, if future orientation is not present at birth, requiring some accumulation of 
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experience, then at what point has sufficient experience been stored in memory to 
anticipate the future.  Moreover, it is not simply a matter of the quantity of what has 
been stored, but more obviously, the domain of that experience.  That is, surely one 
cannot anticipate where to find food if one’s stored experiences have not involved 
previous food-related experiences including attempts to locate food in the past.2 Thus, 
like other adaptive behaviors, the episodic foresight component of memory 
functioning may require certain developmental experiences to occur before it begins 
to function (i.e., the expression of an adaptation may be experience expectant or 
experience dependent; e.g., see Howe, 2011). Specifically, the expression of a fitness-
relevant memory system may not occur until there have been sufficient encounters 
with and knowledge of the situations relevant to current and future need states.3  
 Although to qualify as an adaptation a behavior must emerge at some point 
during an organism’s life, this does not mean that adaptations need to be present early 
in life.  Indeed, many adaptive behaviors emerge long after birth (e.g., bipedal 
locomotion at around 12 months, language usually at 18-24 months, secondary sex 
characteristics during puberty; see Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 
1998; Confer et al., 2010).  In terms of episodic foresight, it is reasonable to assume 
that this adaptive component of memory might emerge even later in some of today’s 
(Western) cultures, given the rather extended periods of infancy and childhood that 
many humans experience (see Gopnik, 2009). 
To answer this ontological question, I will restrict my comments to the human 
developmental literature.  Although some of the paradigms used to examine this 
question in humans (i.e., those involving nonverbal responses) have also been used to 
examine this same question in nonhuman animals (e.g., Martin-Ordas, Atance, & 
Call, in press; Schwartz, Colon, Sanchez, Rodriguez, & Evans, 2002), I will simply 
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consider the developmental trajectory of episodic foresight in young children.  
However, before considering the episodic foresight literature proper, it is important to 
note that even very young infants are capable of anticipating future events.  For 
example, 3- (e.g., Adler & Haith, 2003; Adler, Haith, Arehart, & Lanthier, 2008) and 
4-month-olds (e.g., von Hofsten, Kochukhova, & Rosander, 2007) can visually track 
an object that becomes occluded and anticipate where it should reappear.  This 
anticipatory behavior is not just based on pre-occlusion visual tracking skills or other 
low-level visual processing mechanisms, but involves something more cognitive; that 
is, the infant tracks the objects in their ‘mind’s eye’ even when those objects 
disappear behind the occluder (von Hofsten et al., 2007).  Indeed, infants not only 
exhibit surprise if the occluded object does not reappear in the anticipated position, 
but they are similarly surprised if there are changes in the object’s appearance (e.g., 
height, color) or its identity when it finally does reappear.  This research shows that 
temporal information plays an important role very early in life and that even very 
young infants anticipate future outcomes based (perhaps) on memory for how objects 
have behaved in the past.  Together, these studies on an infant’s grasp of object 
permanence (its continued existence behind the occluder), its physical properties 
(height, color, identity), and trajectory (where it should reappear) not only provide 
valuable information about early expectant (visual) behaviors, but also about what 
might be the precursors to later future thinking. 
Although perhaps a precursor to the future planning aspects of associative 
memory, these results do not demonstrate the sort of episodic foresight that Klein 
(2013) is referring to.4 To date, such studies have only been conducted with 
preschool-age children (3- to 5-year-olds).  Here, there are at least two ways in which 
young children’s future planning has been examined—prospective memory and 
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episodic foresight.  In prospective memory studies, children are asked to remember to 
do something in the future (e.g., bring an item for show-and-tell, check the oven in 20 
minutes, return a book to a friend next time you see them; see Aberle & Kliegel, 
2010; Atance & Jackson, 2009).  Although some of these studies have reported age 
differences favoring older children, other studies have failed to find age differences 
even among the youngest preschool children (for a review, see Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & 
Messer, 2008).  Of course, prospective memory tasks may not involve planning per se 
as they may simply tap children’s ability to remember the instruction to do something 
later. 
More direct tests of children’s episodic foresight have been conducted using 
both nonverbal (e.g., Metcalf & Atance, 2011) and verbal (e.g., Atance & 
Sommerville, in press; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; 
Richmond & Pan, 2013; Scarf, Gross, Colombi, & Hayne, 2013) tests.  Like the 
research on prospective memory, developmental differences in episodic foresight can 
appear and disappear depending on the procedure implemented to examine children’s 
future planning abilities.  For example, in a typical verbal version of this paradigm, 
children might be asked to talk about an event that happened in the past (e.g., earlier 
that day, yesterday, or events more distant in the past) and then about an event that 
might happen in the future (e.g., later the same day, tomorrow, or even further into the 
future).  Here, 3-year-olds often provide less information in their narratives than 4- 
and 5-year-olds for both retrospective and prospective memories, suggesting a 
developmental shift in episodic memory (remembering the past) and episodic 
foresight (anticipating the future) between the ages of 3 and 4 years (see Busby & 
Suddendorf, 2005).   
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However, developmental changes have not always been found.  For example, 
when the task is made easier for younger children (e.g., by providing a visual timeline 
so they can physically track both the past and the future), differences in the 
performance of 3- to 5-year-olds virtually disappear (Hayne et al., 2011).  Similarly, 
in a nonverbal task (remembering to save marbles for a future task), there were no 
differences in the amount saved among 3- to 5-year-olds (Metcalf & Atance, 2011).5   
Still other studies have shown important developmental changes in children’s 
episodic foresight.  Atance and Sommerville (in press) examined episodic foresight in 
3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds.  Here, children were given a problem in one room and, 
following a delay, were taken to a second room where they could select an item to 
solve the earlier presented problem.  Children were also asked questions about the 
original problem to see whether they correctly remembered what it was in order to 
determine the relationship between retrospective episodic memory and prospective 
problem solving.  The results showed that children’s ability to select the correct item 
to secure the solution to the problem increased with age, but this relation was 
mediated by memory for the original problem.  That is, using regression analyses, 
memory for the past, not age, predicted correct item selection.  Thus, the ability to 
remember the past (i.e., the problem in this case) is a major predictor of episodic 
foresight.  That both episodic memory and episodic foresight develop in tandem is 
consistent with neuroscientific evidence demonstrating that both of these processes 
rely on the activation of many of the same neural regions (e.g., Addis, Pan, Vu, 
Laiser, & Schacter, 2009). 
Scarf et al. (2013) also examined episodic memory for the problem and used a 
delay between problem presentation and item selection.  They showed that despite 
being able to form episodic memories for the problem, when the delay between the 
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problem and solution selection was longer than 15 minutes, 3-year-olds did not retain 
the relevant problem information over the delay.  In contrast, 4-year-olds could retain 
this information as long as one week.  These results add to the growing consensus that 
memory for the original problem is key to episodic foresight and that as children 
develop they are better able to retain that information over longer and longer 
intervals.  Indeed, these findings are in line with a wealth of evidence showing that 
improvement in children’s ability to store information in memory (i.e., consolidation) 
is critical to the development of episodic memory (Bauer, 2009).  What Scarf et al. 
(2013) have added is that these changes in retention of past experiences are also 
critical to the development of episodic foresight. 
Finally, Richmond and Pan (2013) have demonstrated that like the changes 
that occur in children’s ability to consolidate information in storage, advances in 
children’s ability to bind elements of the past into a more integrated, relational 
associative network is also predictive of their performance on episodic foresight tasks.  
Although surely binding together past experiences into more integrated traces is also 
related to changes in children’s executive function (e.g., inhibition, working memory; 
see Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), memory for the past is necessary for anticipating 
future outcomes.  That is, remembering previous relevant experiences (in these cases, 
the earlier presented problem) is necessary for successful episodic foresight. 
So, although associative memory may have evolved to afford organisms that 
possess it with the fitness-relevant consequence of being able to anticipate the future 
through remembering the past, such benefits may not be available to humans (or 
nonhuman animals) immediately upon birth.  This is a critical insight that needs to be 
factored into any theory about the evolution of memory, regardless of which direction 
we believe is best to study the fitness-relevant role of an adaptive memory system.  
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Indeed, what the research reviewed here suggests is that there exists a specific 
developmental trajectory for this adaptive advantage, one that unfolds as a 
consequence of the development of episodic memory more generally.  Although there 
exist early precursors to episodic foresight (e.g., visual anticipation), ones that involve 
an immature form of episodic memory (e.g., one that has recently coded the 
properties of objects and their trajectory through space), research has shown that for 
humans, at least, true future planning of the sort Klein (2013) envisages may not 
emerge until three years of age (but see Footnote 5).  As this aspect of memory 
emerges, there are at least four proximate mechanisms that have been identified that 
need to be in place for the mature functioning of episodic foresight: (1) development 
of storage and retention processes (i.e., consolidation; e.g. Scarf et al., 2013), ones 
that depend on neurological maturation (e.g., Bauer, 2009); (2) development of 
retrieval skills so the past that is available in storage is also accessible (e.g., Atance & 
Sommerville, in press); (3) age-related changes in binding so that past experiences 
become better integrated in associative networks (e.g., Richmond & Pan, 2013), again 
something that depends on neurological maturation (e.g., Townsend, Richmond, 
Vogel-Farley, & Thomas, 2010); and (4) age-related improvements in executive 
processing (e.g., response inhibition, working memory; see Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007).  Together these behavioral and neurobiological developments determine the 
emergence of both episodic memory for the past and episodic foresight used to plan 
for the future.  Indeed, it is because humans are animals that rely on the accumulated 
knowledge of our past experiences in order to imagine and plan for our future, 
childhood tends to be a much more protracted period than that of other animal species 
(also see Gopnik, 2009).   
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Footnotes 
1For the purposes of this article, these two terms will be used interchangeably.  
2This question has to do with the development of an organism’s knowledge base, 
something that has been studied extensively in human development (e.g., Ceci, 
Fitneva, & Williams, 2010).  Because of length constraints, and because of the 
seeming obviousness of the proposition that domain relevant experience may be 
necessary for anticipating similar events in the future, there will be no additional 
discussion of this topic in this article (but see discussion in Howe, 2011; Howe & 
Otgaar, 2013). 
3
 Of course, because these critical developmental experiences can differ between 
individuals within and across cultures, fitness-relevant aspects of memory may not 
emerge at the same time in all children. Although, as Klein (2013) opines, we may all 
eventually exhibit episodic foresight, the developmental course of the emergence of 
this adaptive memory effect may vary considerably (also see Howe & Otgaar, 2013). 
4Both Klein (2013) and Tulving (2005) suggest that episodic memory (remembering 
the past) and episodic foresight (anticipating the future) are accompanied by 
autonoetic awareness (a feeling that one is reliving the past or mentally travelling into 
the future, respectively).  Of course, such a requirement rules out nonverbal 
organisms (nonhuman animals and preverbal humans) because there is no way for 
them to report their conscious experiences when remembering the past or planning for 
the future.  Although I will not pursue this issue in depth here, it is important to point 
out that (1) autonoetic awareness may be a simple epiphenomenal component that 
arises in adult humans when remembering the past or anticipating the future, not a 
necessary one, and (2) children not only fulfill all of the other requirements associated 
with possessing episodic memory and foresight, but, whether epiphenomenal or not, 
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even 3-year-olds provide first person accounts of past experiences and future planning 
(e.g., Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011), consistent with the 
autonoetic requirement. 
5
 Despite the availability of nonverbal procedures, researchers have not tested 
episodic foresight in children younger than three years of age.  Because of this, we do 
not know whether children younger than three years of age evince future planning.  
Future research is well advised to adapt these procedures for use in younger children, 
much in the same way nonverbal procedures have been used to examine future-
oriented behavior in nonhuman animals (Martin-Ordas et al., in press; Schwartz et al., 
2002). 
